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by Reason of Insanity Verdict:
Should Juries be Informed
of its Consequences?
INTRODUCTION
In October, 1981, the Kentucky Supreme Court, in Payne v.
Commonwealth,, addressed the question of whether the jury
should be informed of the consequences of a not guilty by reason
of insanity verdict (NGRI). The Court held "that neither the pro-
secutor, defense counsel, nor the court may make any comment
about the consequences of a particular verdict at any time during
a criminal trial."2 This decision overruled prior Kentucky laws
and clarified Kentucky's position on this issue.
This Comment will examine the decisions which led to Ken-
tucky's new rule, analyze the law in other jurisdictions, and recom-
mend that an instruction explaining the consequences of a NGRI
verdibt 4 should be given by the judge in all cases where the
'623 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1981), cert. dented, 456 U.S. 909 (1982).
2 Id. at 870. Only one justice dissented, disagreeing with the majority "to the ex-
tent that the opinion will now prohibit comment during closing argument on the conse-
quences of an insanity verdict." Id. at 879 (Stephenson, J., dissenting).
3 See Paul v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d 569 (Ky. 1981); Gall v. Commonwealth,
607 S.W.2d 97 (Ky. 1980); Jewell v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 807 (Ky. 1977).
4 When Payne was decided, the disposition of a person acquitted by reason of in-
sanity was controlled by Ky. Rav. STAT. § 504.030 (Bobbs-Merrill 1975) [hereinafter cited
as KRS], which provided:
(1) When a defendant is acquitted of an offense for lack of criminal
responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect, as defined m KRS 504.020,
the court may on motion of the prosecuting attorney or on its own motion
proceed immediately to have the defendant committed for examination and
possible detention pursuant to the provisions of KRS chapter 202.
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defense of insanity is properly raised.5
I. PAYNE AND ITS FORERUNNERS
In five cases from 1977 to 1981, the Kentucky Supreme Court
considered the propriety of informing the jury regarding the con-
sequences of an acquittal by reason of insanity 6 The per-
missibility of certain comments by the prosecuting attorney was
established in Jewell v. Commonwealth.7 A little more than four
(2) To facilitate the procedure established in subsection (1), the court,
if it has reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant will cause injury
to himself or others if not immediately restrained, may order him to be
hospitalized in a state hospital for a period not to exceed seven (7) consecutive
days. The order of commitment under this subsection shall be pursuant to
and under the authority of KRS 202.027 and shall be subject to all of the
provisions of that statute.
This section has since been amended, and the new provision became effective July 15,
1982. KRS § 504.030 (Cum. Supp. 1982) now reads:
(1) When a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity the court
shall conduct an involuntary hospitalization proceeding under KRS chapter
202A or 202B.
(2) To facilitate the procedure established in subsection (1) of this sec-
tion, the court may order the detention of the defendant for a period of ten
(10) days to allow for proceedings to be initiated against the defendant for
examination and possible detention pursuant to the provisions of KRS chapter
202A or 202B.
5 A jury in Kentucky may return one of four possible verdicts when "the defendant
provides evidence at trial of his mental illness or insanity at the time of the offense." KRS
§ 504.120 (Cum Supp. 1982). These verdicts include guilty, not guilty, not guilty by reason
of insanity, and guilty but mentally ill. Id. This Comment does not include a discussion
of the propriety of informing a jury of the consequences of a guilty but mentally ill ver-
dict. See KRS §§ 504.130-.150 for a description of the grounds and consequences of a fin-
ding of guilty but mentally ill. The existence of the guilty but mentally ill verdict further
complicates the jury's deliberations in these cases. Thus, the jury should be given an in-
struction as to the different consequences of each insanity related verdict when the defense
of insanity is raised.
6 See Paul v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d at 569; Gall v. Commonwealth, 607
S.W.2d at 97; Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 586 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1979); Edwards v. Com-
monwealth, 554 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 999 (1977); Jewell v. Com-
monwealth, 549 S.W.2d at 807.
7 549 S.W.2d at 807. The Court stated:
Certainly [deranged persons] do not belong in penal institutions, but in the
absence of some kind of realistic provision for their detention a prosecutor
can truthfully remind the jury, as he did in this case, that in the event of
an acquittal on grounds of insanity there is very little, if any, assurance that
they will not soon be at large again.
Id. at 812.
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months later, however, in Edwards v. Commonwealth,8 the
Court determined that any instruction from the trial judge con-
cerning the disposition of a defendant after a NGRI verdict was
improper. 9 The Edwards holding was followed in Edmonds v.
Commonwealth,10 and explained in Gall v. Commonwealth."
Gall interpreted Edwards to mean that defense counsel is not pro-
hibited from briefly explaining to the jury that a defendant ac-
quitted on grounds of insanity could possibly be committed. 12
Thus, although the extent of their remarks is limited,1 3 both the
prosecuting attorney and defense counsel may make certain com-
ments to the jury during closing argument about the disposition
of a defendant following a NGRI verdict, while the trial judge
is totally prohibited from giving the jury any instruction on the
8 554 S.W.2d at 380.
9 Id. at 383-84. The Court concluded:
An instruction of the land here requested has no legitimate bearing on
the issue of fact to be decided by the jury when the defense of insanity has
been raised, that issue being whether the defendant was mentally responsi-
ble when the criminal act was done, and could, we feel, divert the jury s
attention from the resolution of this issue. Moreover, the instruction as re-
quested does not properly declare the law in this state regarding the dispos-
tion of a person acquitted of a charged offense because of a mental disease
or defect.
Id. Thus, such instructions were held improper in general. This instruction in particular
was held improper because it was a misstatement of the law See note 4 supra for text
of the Kentucky statute which was in effect at the time of Edwards.
i0 586 S.W.2d at 27.
11 607 S.W.2d at 111.
12 Id. The Court in Gall explained:
Edwards does not prohibit defense counsel from reminding the jury that if
the defendant is acquitted on grounds of insanity at the time of the offense,
and if he lapses into that condition again, there are legal means to bring
about his commitment, because that is the simple truth. The most defense
counsel can say, and we have never held that he cannot say it, is that if after
the defendant is acquitted there appear reasonable grounds to believe he is
insane and ought to be committed to an institution, he can be tried in a civil
commitment proceeding. We adhere, however, to the view that the prospects
of what may or can happen after the verdict do not belong in the instruc-
tions given by the court to the jury.
Id.
13 See Paul v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d at 570 ("The reason we have held such
remarks [during closing argument by defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney] per-
missible is that they are within the realm of common knowledge and fair comment. It
has never been suggested, however, that they could be introduced in the form of proof,
or that the subject might be pursued in further detail").
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issue. The inconsistency of this situation was noticed in Payne v.
Commonwealth.14
Payne involved a defendant who had been convicted of eight
counts of first-degree sodomy, one count of first-degree sexual abuse
and twenty counts of using a minor in a sexual performance. 15 At
trial, defense counsel requested that final arguments include a
discussion of the consequences of a NGRI verdict. Defense counsel
also requested a jury instruction on the consequences of a NGRI
verdict. Both motions were demed. 16
,On the basis of the Gall decision, defense counsel should have
been permitted to comment on the consequences of a NGBI ver-
dict in his summation. 7 In contrast, the reasoning of the
Supreme Court in Edwards that such information on the conse-
quences of a NGRI verdict should not be involved in the jury's
fact-finding process, 18 supports the view that information regard-
ing such consequences should not be given to the jury by anyone.
Gall suggested no legitimate distinction between the commumca-
tion of this information to the jury by counsel during closing argu-
ment and the communication of this information by the trial court
in its jury instructions. If instructions from the court on this issue
could divert the jury's attention from its proper function, then it
seems equally likely, if not more so, that argument from counsel
could do so. Indeed, counsel is apt to emphasize the possible result
of a NGRI verdict which he feels is most advantageous to his
side. 19
14 623 S.W.2d at 869-70.
15 Id. at 869.
16 Id.
17 See Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d at 111. See note 12 supra for the ra-
tionale of the court in Call.
18 Edwards v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d at 383-84.
19 Defense counsel will emphasize the possibility of commitment, while the pro-
secuting attorney will emphasize the possibility of release. A brief, unbiased outline of
NGRI verdict results from the trial court is the best way to avoid confusion. See Roberts
v. State, 335 So.2d 285, 288 (Fla. 1976) ("The efforts by counsel for both sides to supply
partially accurate information as to those consequences must have served further to con-
fuse the jury. The trial judge should have reduced this confusion by charging the jury
in the manner requested by appellant's trial counsel").
[Vol. 72
1983-84] NGRI VERDICT
In Payne, the Kentucky Supreme Court decided not to allow
anyone to comment on the consequences of a NGRI verdict to the
jury 20 The Court adhered to the reasoning of Edwards, noting:
"[E]xternal considerations have no legitimate bearing on the jury's
factual determination of guilt or innocence."2' The Court also
expressly overruled Jewell, Gall and Paul v. Commonwealth to
the extent that those decisions were inconsistent with Payne. 2
The result of Payne is to align Kentucky with the so-called "ma-
jority position."'
II. VIEWS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
At least three man views have been adopted by the states with
respect to the propriety of instructions on the consequences of a
NGRI verdict: 1) nineteen states hold that no instruction is
proper;1 2) six states consider the propriety of such instruction
20 623 S.W.2d at 870.
21 Id.
2 Id.
23 See generally Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 737 (1967), for a review of cases dealing with
the propriety or necessity of giving, in a criminal case where the defense of insanity or
mental irresponsibility is raised, instructions to the jury as to the hospitalization of the
defendant in the event of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
The Kentucky Supreme Court cited this Annotation in Edwards as support for the
conclusion that the majority rule is against the instruction. 554 S.W. 2d at 383. This Com-
ment argues that there is no longer a "majority" rule.
2 Decisions from 16 of these states clearly hold that no instruction is proper: State
v. MeShine, 642 P.2d 482, 484 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Garrett v. State, 320 A.2d 745,
750 (Del. 1974); State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180, 186 (Iowa 1979); State v. Park, 193
A.2d 1, 5 (Me. 1963); Brown v. State, 260 A.2d 665, 668 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970); State
v. Carignand, 271 N.W.2d 442, 443 (Minn. 1978); State v. French, 531 P.2d 373, 378
(Mont. 1975); State v Reitenbaugh, 284 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Neb. 1979); State v. Lujan, 608
P.2d 1114, 116 (N.M. 1980); State v. Boham, 279 N.E.2d 609, 615 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971);
Thomsen v. State, 582 P.2d 829, 832 (Okla. Cnm. App. 1978); State v. Arpin, 410 A.2d
1340, 1352 (R.I. 1980); State v. Smith, 396 A.2d 126, 129 (Vt. 1978); Rollins v. Com-
monwealth, 151 S.E.2d 622, 627 (Va. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1026 (1967); State
v. White, 374 P.2d 942, 956 (Wash. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 883 (1963); Lonquest
v. State, 495 P.2d 575, 584 (Wyo. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972).
Three other states which presently refuse to give such instructions could be classified
with the states which leave the question of giving such instruction to the discretion of the
trial judge, but due to the lack of decisions allowing such instructions, are properly plac-
ed in this category. Carr v State, 198 So.2d 791, 798 (Ala. Ct. App. 1967) (trial court
properly refused to give charge which stated that if verdict were not guilty by reason of
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
to be a matter of judicial discretion;25 and 3) eighteen states plus
the District of Columbia hold the instruction to be proper.2 This
latter group includes four different approaches: 1) in nine states
the instruction must or should be given in any case where the
defense of insanity is properly raised;2 2) one state and the
District of Columbia require the instruction to be given unless the
defendant objects;28 3) in five states the instruction must be given
upon the defendant's request;2 and 4) three states allow the in-
struction to be given upon the request of the defendant or the
jury 30
insanity, it would be duty of court to commit defendant to state hospital, because the
charge did not state correct principle of law), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 877 (1967); Camp-
bell v. State, 228 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Ark. 1950) (the court found the instructions improper
because they did not properly declare the law, adding that it was no official concern of
the jury what procedure might be followed after a NGRI verdict); People v. Givans, 228
N.E.2d 123, 125 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967) (instructions were held properly refused, although
the court stated that an instruction might be allowed when an unobjectionable remark
is made by the prosecutor).
25 People v. Mallette, 102 P.2d 1084 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940); State v. Wade, 113 A.
458 (Conn. 1921); Albert v State, 263 S.E.2d 685 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979); Dipert v. State,
286 N.E.2d 405 (Ind. 1972); Smith v. State, 220 So.2d 313 (Miss. 1969); State v. Huiett,
246 S.E.2d 862 (S.C. 1978).
26 Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961
(1958); Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907 (Alaska 1973); People v Thomson, 591 P.2d 1031
(Colo. 1979); Roberts v. State, 335 So.2d 285 (Fla. 1976); State v. Amorn, 574 P.2d 895
(Hawaii 1978); State v. Hamilton, 534 P.2d 226 (Kan. 1975); State v. Babin, 319 So.2d
367 (La. 1975); Commonwealth v. Mutina, 323 N.E.2d 294 (Mass. 1975); People v. Cole,
172 N.W.2d 354 (Mich. 1969); State v. Pike, 516 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); Kuk
v. State, 392 P.2d 630 (Nev. 1964); Novosel v. Helgemoe, 384 A.2d 124 (N.H. 1978); State
v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289 (N.J. 1975); State v. Hammonds, 224 S.E.2d 595 (N.C. 1976); Com-
monwealth v. Mulgrew, 380 A.2d 349 (Pa. 1977); Mothershed v. State, 578 S.W.2d 96
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Daggett, 280 S.E.2d 545 (W Va. 1981); State v. Shoff-
ner, 143 N.W.2d 458 (Wis. 1966); N.Y. CRIM PROc. LAw § 300.10(3) (McKinney 1982).
27 State v. Hamilton, 534 P.2d at 226, Kuk v. State, 392 P.2d at 630; Novosel v.
Helgemoe, 384 A.2d at 124; State v. Krol, 344 A.2d at 289; Commonwealth v. Mulgrew,
380 A.2d at 349; Mothershed v. State, 578 S.W.2d at 96; State v. Daggett, 280 S.E.2d
at 545; State v. Shoffner, 143 N.W.2d at 458; N.Y. CRiM. Pnoc. LAw § 300.10(3) (McKin-
ney 1982).
28 Lyles v. United Stats, 254 F.2d at 725; Roberts v. State, 335 So.2d at 285.
29 Schade v. State, 512 P.2d at 907; People v. Thomson, 591 P.2d at 1031; State
v. Amorin, 574 P.2d at 895; State v. Pike, 516 S.W.2d at 505; State v. Hammonds, 224
S.E.2d at 595.
30 State v. Babin, 319 So.2d at 367; Commonwealth v. Mutina, 323 N.E.2d at 294;
People v. Cole, 172 N.W.2d at 354.
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The rule that no instruction is proper has been referred to as
the majority position. 31 Obviously, it is no longer clear that there
is a majority position.32 In fact, the recent trend seems to be
away from the "no instruction" rule.-" Yet, Kentucky adheres to
the "no instruction rule" as stated initially in Edwards and recently
expanded in Payne.
A. "No Instruction" is Proper
One argument is central to all the cases which advocate not
giving an instruction on the consequences of a NGRI verdict. This
argument rests on the theory that where the assessment of punish-
ment is for the court, instructions as to punishment are unnecessary
and should not be given since they will not aid the jury in deter-
mining the issue of guilt.34 Although the treatment given a per-
son acquitted on grounds of insanity is not generally considered
punishment, these cases have held that the same theory applies.35
31 See, e.g., Garrett v. State, 320 A.2d at 749. See also Annot., supra note 23.
32 See notes 24-30 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the different ap-
proaches taken in various states.
3 Several states have recently overturned prior law and are now in favor of giving
an instruction on the consequences of a NGRI verdict. See People v. Thomson, 591 P.2d
at 1031; Roberts v. State, 335 So.2d at 285; State v. Hammonds, 224 S.E.2d at 595; Com-
monwealth v. Mulgrew, 380 A.2d at 349. But see State v. Smith, 396 A.2d at 126 (conse-
quences of NGRI verdict should not be charged to the jury).
34 Annot., supra note 23, at 739. See, e.g., State v. Wade, 113 A. at 458. The court
in Wade stated:
It is no part of the duty of the jury to pass upon the pumshment of the ac-
cused. The jury determines the guilt or innocence of the accused; the court
pronounces sentence. With the rendering of the verdict the duty and
responsibility of the jury ends. The enforcement of the verdict by the pro-
nouncement of sentence and the rendition of judgment is a duty resting wholly
with the court. It will not help the jury in the performance of their duty
to know what the penalty may be, nor what disposition will be made of
accused.
Id. at 460 (citation omitted).
35 Annot., supra note 23, at 739. See, e.g., State v. Park, 193 A.2d at 1. The Court
in Park remarked:
It has long been the settled practice in our State that the function of
the jury is to find the facts and to apply the law as given by the Court to
the facts in reaching their verdict. Punishment, or whatever may transpire
after the verdict, is not the concern of the jury.
No exception to this general rule is found in our cases where the plea
has been not guilty by.reason of insanity.
Id. at 5.
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When the defense of insanity is raised, the jury's job is to decide
whether or not the defendant was mentally responsible when he
committed the crime. Whatever is done with the defendant later
should make no difference to this determination. Thus, there is
no reason to inform the jury of the possibilities. In fact, giving
the jury such information simply invites them to consider the results
of a particular verdict and may influence their factual
determination.36 The fear is that on the basis of this knowledge
of the defendant's post-verdict status the jury may reach a com-
promise verdict. For example, if a jury felt sympathy for a defend-
nat or was unsure of his culpability it might prefer to give a NGRI
verdict, knowing that while the defendant would not be set free
he or she would not go to prison either.37
The Kentucky Supreme Court accepted this argument in
Edwards.is By eliminating the possibility that counsel might so
inform the jury in closing argument, the Court in Payne ended
the inconsistency that had developed in Kentucky law 9 Ken-
tucky law is now clear:
The main function of the jury is to determine guilt or in-
nocence. The consideration of future consequences such as
treatment, civil commitment, probation, shock probation, and
parole have no place in the jury's finding of fact and may serve
36 See State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d at 186 ("Consequently an instruction to the
jury regarding the post-trial disposition of a defendant found not guilty by reason of in-
sanity is irrelevant to the jury's proper function. It could only serve to confuse the jury
or invite it to consider improperly defendant's post-trial disposition"); State v. French,
531 P.2d at 378 ("[A]n instruction of this type allows irrelevant matters to be considered
by the jury which may influence its decision. By instructing a jury on various
possibilities of sentence, the court suggests that it should give weight to that possibility
in reaching a verdict") (quoting State v. Zuidema, 485 P.2d 952, 956 (Mont. 1971)); Lon-
quest v. State, 495 P.2d at 584 ("The giving of such instruction injects a totally irrelevant
element into the jury's deliberations separate and apart from the function they serve and
may tend to confuse them. The suggested instruction may be an invitation for the
jury to reach a compromise verdict ").
37 But see Schwartz, Should Juries Be Informed of the Consequences of the Insani-
ty Verdict?, 8 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 167, 174 (1980). Schwartz points out that there is no
solid reason to believe that jurors view commitment as an alternative less drastic than im-
prisonment. Clearly there has been increasing popular sentiment against asylums. Id.
3 554 S.W.2d at 383-84.
39 See text accompanying notes 6-19 supra for a disclssion of the inconsistency that
had developed in Kentucky law.
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to distort it. For that reason we now hold that neither the pro-
secutor, defense counsel, nor the court may make any comment
about the consequences of a particular verdict at any time dur-
ing a criminal trial.
[E]xtemal considerations have no legitimate bearing
on the jury's factual determination of guilt or innocence. 40
B. The Instruction is Proper
The argument in favor of instructing the jury on the conse-
quences of a NGRI verdict begins with the premise that, as a mat-
ter of fact, jurors do consider the consequences of their verdicts.41
Jurors are not sterile intellectual mechanisms making decisions in
an emotional vacuum. 42 It does seem natural that people who
are making such important decisions about another person will
be concerned about the results of their decision. In several cases,
the jurors have asked questions or otherwise evidenced this
concern. 43 Thus, whether or not the jurors are supposed to con-
40 Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d at 870.
41 Weihofen, Procedure for Determining Defendant's Mental Condition Under the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, 29 TEMP. L.Q. 235, 247 (1956). Weihofen
argues that the Model Penal Code should expressly endorse giving an instruction on the
NGRI verdict. He examines the traditional view that jurors should not be concerned with
the defendant's post-verdict status, and states:
But the fact is that jurors do concern themselves with [what will be done
to the defendant if he is acquitted by reason of mental irresponsibility].
Preliminary statistics on the jury project being conducted by the University
of Chicago Law School show that this is indeed one of the most important
factors in the jury deliberations.
Id.
42 Commonwealth v. Mutina, 323 N.E.2d at 300.
43 See Campbell v. State, 141 S.E.2d 186, 187 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965) (juror asked
whether defendant if sentenced would be automatically given psychiatric treatment or
if he would go to the penitentiary); Dipert v. State, 286 N.E.2d at 406 (on voir dire one
juror asked what would happen if defendant were found not guilty by reason of insam-
ty); Brown v. State, 260 A.2d at 668 (while the jurors were deliberating, they sent the
court a note which read, "If Mr. Brown, the defendant, is found insane by the jury, will
he be allowed to go free or will he be put in a mental institution?"); State v. White, 374
P.2d at 956 (after verdict appellant's counsel filed their own affidavit stating the result
of their post-trial interviews with seven members of the jury. It showed that the imposi-
tion of the death penalty resulted primarily because a majority of the jury felt they could
not trust the authorities to keep appellant institutionalized until he was safe to be at large).
1983-84]
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cern themselves with the results of verdicts, they probably do.44
The situation is complicated when the insanity defense is in-
volved. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized this problem 45 and advocated giving the jury instruc-
tions on the consequences of a NGRI verdict, 46 basically on the
grounds that the average juror does not have the same understan-
ding of a NGRI verdict as he does of a guilty or not guilty verdict:
It is common knowledge that a verdict of not guilty means that
the prisoner goes free and that a verdict of guilty means that he
is subject to such punsishment as the court may impose. But a
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity has no such common-
ly understood meaning. It means neither freedom nor
punishment. We think the jury has a right to know the
meaning of this possible verdict as accurately as it knows by com-
mon knowledge the meaning of the other two possible
verdicts. 47
If the jurors are concerned with the disposition of defendants
after a verdict and if they do not have a sufficient understanding
of the meaning of a NGRI verdict, then the verdict they reach
may be based on a misunderstanding. They might reach a ver-
dict of guilty out of fear that the defendant will go free if
acquitted. 48 The proponents of the "no instruction" rule argue
that giving the jury information as to the results of its verdict will
lead to result-oriented verdicts. 49 But denying the jury this infor-
mation could have the same effect. Worse, the jury might base
its verdict on assumptions which may or may not be accurate. If
the jury is "aware of the true disposition after a verdict of not guilty
44 The trial judge in Payne acknowledged that the jurors might be wondering about
the consequences of a NGRI verdict. Brief for Appellant at 10, Payne v. Commonwealth,
623 S.W.2d at 867. In fact, the court even stated that it believed the jurors should know
the effect of such a verdict. Brief at 9.
45 See, e.g., Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d at 725. This is the seminal case of those
proposing that the jury be given instructions on the consequences of a NGRI verdict. See
Schade v. State, 512 P.2d at 918; People v. Thomson, 591 P.2d at 1032; State v. Arnorm,
574 P.2d at 898; Novosel v. Helgemoe, 384 A.2d at 130.
46 254 F.2d at 728.
47 Id. See note 45 supra for cases referring to this passage in support of giving an
instruction on the consequences of a NGRI verdict.
48 Commonwealth v. Mutina, 323 N.E.2d at 298; Weihofen, supra note 41, at 247.
49 See, e.g., State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d at 186.
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by reason of insanity, they might [be] more disposed to render a
verdict based on the evidence, free from their understandable fears
for the safety and security of the public." 50 At any rate, jurors
could make a decision with the benefit of accurate information
rather than with questionable assumptions. 5'
Allowing the jury to proceed on the basis of unenlightened
confusion about the consequences of a NGRI verdict increases the
possibility of a miscarriage of justice. The Michigan Surpeme Court
viewed the problem as a choice between:
(1) the possible miscarnage of justice by imprisoning a defen-
dant who should be hospitalized, due to refusal to so advise the
jury; and
(2) the possible "invitation to the jury" to forget their oath to
render a true verdict according to the evidence by advising them
of the consequence of a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity 52
The Michigan court concluded that the importance of preventing
such a miscarriage of justice far outweighed the possibility of in-
viting the jury to consider matters extraneous to the merits.0
Jurors are, and should be, concerned with the protection of society
One of the reasons they give guilty verdicts is to incarcerate
dangerous persons. But sending a person who should be hospitaliz-
ed to prison because of a lack of understanding of the NGRI ver-
dict is unacceptable. 54
1. Counter-Arguments
There are three main objections to giving an instruction on
the NGRI verdict. Some courts have argued that since there is no
50 Commonwealth v. Mutina, 323 N.E.2d at 298.
51 Weihofen, supra note 41, at 247.
52 People v. Cole, 172 N.W.2d at 366.
53 Id. See also Schade v. State, 512 P.2d at 918; People v. Thomson, 591 P.2d at
1032; State v. Babin, 319 So.2d at 380.
4 In several cases, the courts felt that this is what happened. See Commonwealth
v. Mutina, 323 N.E.2d at 301-02; State v. Hammonds, 224 S.E.2d at 603-04.
This may have occurred in Payne. At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, ap-
pellant informed the court that he had spoken with four members of the jury who said
they wanted to return a NGRI verdict but did not want appellant to be released; Brief
for Appellant at 9, Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d at 867.
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instruction on the consequences of other verdicts, there should be
no instruction on the consequences of a NGRI verdict., The
theory is that giving an instruction as to the consequences of a
NGRI verdict will embark the courts on a slippery slope leading
to a situation where the jury would be informed of all post-
conviction procedures.5 This argument ignores the basic dif-
ference between the NGBI verdict and a simple guilty or not guilty
verdict.57
Another criticism is that any instruction sufficiently explain-
ing the results of a NGRI verdict would be too confusing.8 The
instruction, however, could be given in such a way as to alleviate
rather than create confusion. 59
55 See, e.g., Brown v. State, 260 A.2d at 668.
- See td. See also Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d at 870 ("The considera-
tion of future consequences such as treatment, civil commitment, probation, shock pro-
bation, and parole have no place in the jury's finding of fact and may serve to distort it").
57 See notes 41-53 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the difference
between a NGRI verdict and a simple guilty or not guilty verdict. Although jurors may
not know the specific consequences of a guilty verdict, they do have a general understan-
ding of the verdict's meaning. With respect to a NGRI verdict, the juror may not have
even a general understanding. There is an important difference between being confused
or unaware as to a particular result of a verdict, such as length of incarceration, and be-
ing confused or ignorant as to the very nature of defendant's disposition. The latter situa-
tion should be rectified. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Fredencks, 578 F.2d 927,
935 (3d Cir. 1978); State v. Babin, 319 So.2d at 380-81; Note, Defendant's Right to Jury
Instruction on Consequences of Verdict of Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, 16 WAYNE
L. REv. 1197, 1203-04 (1970).
58 See Garrett v. State, 320 A.2d at 749-50 ("No instruction could have been for-
mulated in this case with any reasonable degree of clarity and certainty. Such in-
struction would have substituted one unacceptable area of speculation and conjecture for
another"); State v. Wallace, 333 A.2d 72, 79 (Me. 1975) ("[N]o instruction could ade-
quately postulate the impact of such a verdict on the appellants future tenure in the
institution").
It is certainly possible that an instruction on the consequences of a NGRI verdict
could be confusing. If the instruction attempted to set out every particular possibility and
each procedure, jurors might very well end up more confused than they began. Also, a
mere reading of the statutory language might only increase confusion. See Note, State
v. Hammonds-A New Rule in North Carolina On Instructing the Jury on the Disposi-
tion of a Defendant Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 13 WAKE FoIRFr L. REv. 201, 212
(1977).
59 The reason for giving the instruction is to clear up any confusion concerning the
results of a NGRI verdict. The intent is simply to give the jurors a general understanding
of what happens to a defendant acquitted on grounds of insanity.
NGRI VERDICT
It is also argued that jurors probably know that hospitaliza-
tion results from a NGRI verdict anyway, ® so an instruction of
the consequences is unnecessary But, an instruction would still
benefit those jurors who are not so well-informed, and surely would
do no harm to those who already possess the informaton.6
2. Variations on the "instruction is proper" rule
Jurisdictions which presently hold that it is proper to give a
jury instruction on the consequences of a NGRI verdict have
followed four different approaches: (1) the instruction must or
should be given in any case where the defense of insanity is pro-
perly raised;62 (2) the instruction must be given unless it appears
affirmatively on the record that the defendant does not want the
instruction;6 (3) the-instruction must be given upon the defen-
dant's request;6 and (4) the instruction must be given upon the
request of the defendant or the jury 6
Forms (2) and (3) have essentially the same result. Under both
variations, the defendant has complete control over whether or
not the instruction is given. Generally, giving the instruction will
60 See People v. Smith, 108 Cal. Rptr. 698, 714 (Ct. App. 1973); State v. Hood, 187
A.2d 499, 501 (Vt. 1963); R. SIMON, THE JURYANDTHE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 92-92 (1967).
But see Schwartz, supra note 37, at 173-74.
61 R. SIMON, supra note 60, at 96. She states:
While the data show that a commitment instruction is not specifically need-
ed, we do not offer these results as policy advice. Rather, we think it would
be a useful precaution to include such an instruction under all circumstances
and not leave it to the common sense of the jury. On occasion it can do some
good and it can never do any harm.
Id.
62 See State v. Hamilton, 534 P.2d at 226; Kuk v. State, 392 P.2d at 630; Novosel
v. Helgemoe, 384 A.2d at 124; State v. Krol, 344 A.2d at 289; Commonwealth v. Mulgrew,
380 A.2d at 349; Mothershed v. State, 578 S.W.2d at 96; State v. Daggett, 280 S.E.2d
at 545; State v. Shoffner, 143 N.W.2d at 458; N.Y. CRIM. Pnoc. LAw § 300.10(3) (McKin-
ney 1982).
6 See Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d at 725; Roberts v. State, 335 So.2d at 285.
64 See Schade v. State, 512 P.2d at 907; People v. Thomson, 591 P.2d at 1031; State
v. Amorn, 574 P.2d at 895; State v. Pike, 516 S.W.2d at 505; State v. Hammonds, 224
S.E.2d at 595.
65 See State v. Babin, 319 So.2d at 368; Commonwealth v. Mutina, 323 N.E.2d at
298; People v. Cole, 172 N.W.2d at 356.
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benefit the defendant,6 but there may be situations where the
instruction is prejudicial to him.Y Allowing the defendant sole
control over when the instruction may be given is not consistent
with the purpose of giving the instruction, which is to enhance
the reliability of the verdict.68
Further, giving the instruction should not be dependent upon
the jury's request (form(4)). Jurors who do not know that they
have the wrong information will not think to make a request.0
The instruction may be more likely to influence jurors if prompted
solely by their request after deliberation or stalemate.70
The purposes of giving an instruction to the jury on the con-
sequences of a NGRI verdict are: (1) to raise the jurors' understan-
ding of the meaning of this verdict to the same level as their
6 The defendant benefits when the jury is relieved of the misconception that a NGRI
verdict lets him go "scot free."
67 See Government of Virgin Islands v. Fredericks, 578 F.2d at 936 (The court notes
that a juror who believes the defendant is innocent but dangerous might be willing to
compromise to a verdict of NGRI). In several cases where the court addressed the instruc-
tion issue, it was the defendant who objected to the instruction. See, e.g., Lyles v. United
States, 254 F.2d at 725 (If the record shows that the defendant objected to instructions
on the effect of a NGRI verdict, the failure of the trial court to give such instruction will
not be considered grounds for reversal).
68 Schwartz, supra note 37, at 175. The defendant's interest is in a verdict that favors
him; thus, if he thinks that omitting the instruction will be to his advantage, he will not
request it. See Kuk v. State, 392 P.2d at 635 ("In our view the propriety of giving the
instruction should not depend on whether the defendant wants it"); State v. Hood, 187
A.2d at 501 ("At best it tends to give justice an a la carte quality in which the defendant
may make as wily a choice as possible").
At least two states which have a rule making the instruction dependent upon the
defendant's request have recently expanded their position to allow the trial court judge
to give the instruction on his own initiative. See Commonwealth v. Callahan, 406 N.E.2d
385 (Mass. 1980) (extending Commonwealth v. Mutina, 323 N.E.2d at 294) (trial court
could give such instruction on its own initiative where the issue is fairly raised and the
defendant does i ot object); People v. Tenbrink, 287 N.W.2d 223 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979)
(extending People v. Cole, 172 N.W.2d at 354) (trial court may give such instruction on
its own initiative absent objection by defense counsel).
Although these two cases now allow the court to give the instruction without defen-
dant's request, the defendant can still prevent the instruction by objection. Thus, their
holdings did not go far enough.
See Note, supra note 57 at 1197, 1203, for an analysis of People v. Cole, and for
an argument supporting the giving of an instruction whenever the defense of insanity is
fairly raised.
69 Schwartz, supra note 37, at 176.
70 Note, supra note 57, at 1202.
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understanding of the guilty and not guilty verdicts; (2) to assist
the jury in making a fair determination of the facts by removing
inappropriate fears and questions; and (3) to prevent the possible
imprisonment of a person who should be hospitalized due to a
misunderstanding of the NGRI verdict.' The fulfillment of these
purposes should not depend on the defendant's, jury's or pro-
secutor's request. Rather, the instruction should be given by the
trial court in every case in which the defense of insanity is pro-
perly raised (form(l)).
C. The Instruction ts Discretionary
The third main view is that the trial court has discretion
whether to give the jury an instruction on the consequences of a
NGRI verdict.72 The argument is that giving the instruction is
sometimes good and sometimes bad; thus, any inflexible rule must
lead to harsh results. 73 One commentator has argued:
The trial judge, guided by his mstincts and his experience, should
be free to "smell out" jury bias, as we trust him to do in other
areas of the law He is in a position better than the appellate
courts or the legislatures to detect the danger of jury prejudice
in particular cases and to gage how that danger can most effec-
tively be mimmized. 74
This approach contains at least two problems. First, it will
necessarily result in increased litigation. 75 Requiring an appellate
court to try to determine whether the tril judge overstepped the
bounds of his discretion is troublesome and easily avoided by simply
requiring the trial court to give an instruction. More important-
ly, leaving this issue to the discretion of the trial court could lead
to arbitrary results.
71 See, e.g., People v. Cole, 172 N.W.2d at 365-66. See also Schwartz, supra note
37, at 171.
72 See People v. Mallette, 102 P.2d at 1084; State v. Wade, 113 A. at 458; Albert
v. State, 263 S.E.2d at 685; Dipert v. State, 286 N.E.2d at 405; Smith v. State, 220 So.2d
at 315; State v. Hmuett, 246 S.E.2d at 865.
73 Schwartz, supra note 37, at 177-78.
74Id.
75 Note, supra note 59, at 211.
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III. COMMENTS BY COUNSEL
An issue which is secondary to the instruction by the court
issue is whether counsel should be allowed to make comments to
the jury concerning the consequences of a NGRI verdict. If the
jurisdiction is one which allows no instruction from the trial court
on this issue, then permitting counsel to argue the issue to the jury
invites prejudicial and confusing comments which cannot be
cured 6 On the other hand, if the prosecutor and defense counsel
explain the consequences of the NGRI verdict, then perhaps an
instruction from the court is unnecessary 7 Counsel's arguments,
however, will stress the law most advantageous to their respec-
tive positions, while an instruction from the court would be un-
biased. Also, as was recognized by the Kentucky Supreme Court
in Payne,7 allowing counsel to comment on the consequences of
a NGRI verdict is inconsistent with the theory behind the "no in-
struction is proper" rule.7 9
The situation is different in a jurisdiction which considers an
instruction on the consequences of a NGRI verdict to be proper.
In such jurisdictions, there is no theoretical reason against allow-
ing counsel to comment.80 Of course, the trial court has broad
discretion in controlling the scope of closing arguments, but the
prosecutor and defense counsel should be afforded a full oppor-
tunity to advance their competing interpretations, and to em-
76 People v. Mallette, 102 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940) ("[Aifter the remarks
of the district attorney the court declined to explain to the jury that a finding of
insanity would require defendant to be confined in the state hospital for the criminally
insane. This, he should have done, in view of the remarks of the district attorney");
Roberts v. State, 335 So.2d 285, 288 (Fla. 1970) (Counsel for each side supplied partially
accurate information as to the consequences of a NGRI verdict. These efforts must have
confused the jury. The trial judge should have reduced this confusion by charging the
jury in the manner requested by appellants trial counsel).
77 Bean v. State, 398 P.2d 251 (Nev. 1965) (refusal to give instruction dealing with
consequences of NGRI verdict was error but the error was not prejudicial where defense
counsel's jury summation supplied essentially the same information), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 1012 (1966).
78 623 S.W.2d at 869-70.
79 See notes 13-22 supra and accompanying text.
80 See, e.g., Lingo v. State, 162 S.E.2d 1, 8 (Ga.) (court held that the solicitor
general's statement to the jury was a correct statement of law and, thus, was not reversi-
ble error), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 992 (1968).
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phasize the principles of law that favor their respective
positions. 8' As to questions of law, "if the applicable principles
are undisputed then a statement by counsel might well be
helpful rather than confusing."8 2
The question, however, is whether it is helpful to permit
counsel to comment on the consequences of a NGRI verdict when
the trial court is already giving such an instruction.s3 The pur-
pose of the instruction is to raise the jury's awareness of and to
reduce confusion about the NGRI verdict, thus encouraging an
unbiased decision on the facts and preventing a miscarriage of
]ustice. Allowing counsel to argue the issue may place too much
importance on the results of the verdict and give this issue too much
weight in the jury's deliberation. Also, counsel's comments will
not be unbiased, so the jury may not receive a clear and accurate
idea of the results of a NGRI verdict. An instruction by the trial
court will give the jury adequate information. Additional com-
ments by counsel are undesirable.84
CONCLUSION
The decision in Payne eliminated an inconsistency in Kentucky
law It did so, however, at the expense of all defendants who wish
to raise the defense of insanity A better decision would have been
to overrule Edwards and Edmonds, as well as Paul, Gall and
Jewell, and create a rule requiring the trial court to give an in-
struction on the consequences of the NGRI verdict but preven-
ting the prosecutor or defense counsel from commenting on the
issue. The holding in Payne ignores the jury's natural concern with
the disposition of the defendant. Now a defendant in Kentucky
who proves his insanity faces the possibility of conviction, not
81 United States v. Sawyer, 443 F.2d 712, 713-14 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
82 Id. at 714.
83 Id. ("Counsel may emphasize a point that would otherwise be overlooked in the
context of lengthy jury instructions that are themselves often confusing"). In the present
context, however, such comment might over-emphasize the issue of results of the verdict.
84 Catlin v. United States, 251 F.2d 368, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ("We point out,
however, that the better practice is for the trial judge, rather than counsel, to give the
explanation to the jury"); People v. Staggs, 271 N.W.2d 211, 215 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978)
("We would, however, again caution the attorneys against arguing the issue of disposi-
tion before the jury "); see also Note, supra note 57, at 1204.
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because the jurors think he is guilty of the crime in question, but
because they think he is insane and they want to protect society
In any case in which the defense of insanity is properly rais-
ed, the trial court should be required to instruct the jury on the
consequences of the NGRI verdict. The instruction should not be
so detailed as to create rather than dispel confusion. It should give
the jurors an understanding of the meaning of a NGRI verdict.
Its purpose is not to encourage a verdict based on results, but to
free the jurors from worries about results so they can base their
verdict on the facts. The instruction should include a statement
to the effect that the instruction is meant to be purely informa-
tional and is to have no persuasive bearing on the jury's deter-
mination of a proper verdict under the evidence.85 In this way,
the court could provide the jury with accurate information and
advise the jurors of its correct use. Such an instruction will pro-
vide a more equitable result in criminal trials where the defen-
dant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity
Jennifer Fletcher
85 People v. Thomson, 591 P.2d 1031 (Colo. 1979); State v. Amorin, 574 P.2d 895,
899 (Hawaii 1978). These states require that a statement indicating that the instruction
is purely informational be included in the instruction.
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